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AUTHOR'S NOTE
Paper presented at the International Conference «Wars and Violent Conflicts in Africa»,
ISCTE, 21-22 February 2002
1 In the thirty years of intermittent studies and contacts I had with Ethiopian friends and
colleagues over their different interpretations of the country's past, I was often struck by
the diverging and often opposing views of the country's history which they passionately
held  and  which  hotly  divided  groups  coming  from  different  cultural,  social  and
particularly ethnic backgrounds1.  This «divided» national ethos has lingered for many
years in Ethiopian studies and in society at large but assumed political visibility more
recently following the repression of ethnic politics and dissent by the Derg in the period
1974-1991,  and the heightening of  the local/regional  element in the structure of  the
Ethiopian state due to the ethnically based policies of the present regime.
2 The debate over the reading of the country's past involves different historio-graphical
aspects and variant interpretations but is mainly focused on diverging views over the
nature of the multi-ethnic state and the gradual process of expansion and amalgamation
of its different nationalities. To some (the groups belonging to the Christian Highland
Semitic-speaking Amhara-Tigray groups) the «unity of the nation was assumed and largely
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unquestioned»; they  genuinely  shared  the  long-held  imperial  view  that  «Ethiopia  was
Abyssinia writ larger. The nation did not need to be built; it simply existed»2. To others, mainly
coming from the southwestern and eastern border regions which had been forcefully
annexed by Emperor Menelik at the end of the nineteenth century, the Empire was a
mere product of «internal colonialism» and a «prison of nations», if ever there was one3.
3 The  measure  of  individual  and  collective  violence  which  accompanied  the  historical
unfolding of the country has been differently evaluated by observers4 and has become
today a troublesome bone of contention in public discourse over the country's destiny.
But most would agree with John Abbink that «a gradual rooting of violence as a pattern and
ideology of behaviour» has become an institutional component of the Ethiopian experience
in recent years, and today expresses itself, in the scholarly world, in the various radical
modes of the historical discourse, themselves an indication of the growing «culture of
violence»  which  accompanies  today's  debate  over  the  growth  and  destiny  of  the
Ethiopian state. According to Abbink, this «legacy of violence», which is yet to be fully
explored and acknowledged in Ethiopia, goes back to the very foundation of the Ethiopian
state,  and  must  include  both  the  forced  incorporation  by  the  Ethiopian  State  of  its
neighbouring peoples and the brutal colonial repression of the Fascist period (1935-1941),
as well as the domestic violence of Haile Sellassie's modernisation policies. The brutal
enactment  of  boundless  state  violence  which  became  a  daily  practice  during  the
revolutionary years 1974-1991 resulted finally in the «crumbling of the Ethiopian state and of
the imagination of a common Ethiopian identity», both «the alienation of people from the state,
but also from each other»5. The memory of this enduring structure of violence has lingered
on more in private perceptions and individual and family remembrance than in public
discourse. For the most part, the acknowledgement of the country's past divisions and
present sorrows have tended to remain till recently silent or muted: 
«Memories  of  terror  and  violent  death  have  been  engrained  in  the  minds  and
bodies of the population, and are ever-present in the country's collective memory.
This  collective  memory  can  be  said  to  consist  of  the  shared  but  unarticulated
recollection of experiences of violence and intimidation, which were internalized
by people and muted in expression. This memory forms a frame of reference, which
people recognize among each-other, but which is not openly talked-about»6.
4 In this paper I will attempt to describe how, during the two years of bloody conflict which
confronted the newly-born State of Eritrea with its old mother-country, Ethiopia, the two
former allies and «brotherly» countries used war as a direct and openly antagonistic way
for  acknowledging  the  «tense  past»  between  them  and  within  the  region  at  large.
Between May 1998 and December 2000, when the peace accord was signed in Algiers, the
two  countries  fought  an  extremely  violent  propaganda  war  which  accompanied  and
sustained on both sides the fighting in the field. This «war of words»7 was aimed not only
at  defending the  reciprocal  rights  of  each country over  the  disputed borders  but  at
projecting  as  well  the  newly-acquired  national  identities  after  the  breaking  away  of
Eritrea. A public use of the past thus came to be enacted during the war in an attempt to
realign the historical identity of each country and to adapt it to the new geo-political set-
up which came about with the demise of the Derg regime in 1991.
5 In this way, war was used as a storehouse for acknowledging tense past between the two
countries and for indicting each other's faults in the shaping of the national destiny. The
conflict thus created new venues for historical assertions and denials in the region. In the
course of the war, two opposing visions of national identity came to be proposed. The fact
that the Eritrean identity had to be carved out of a previously shared Ethiopian one made
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matters all the more forceful and inevitably painful. Acknowledging tense past between
the two peoples became a way to distinguish the two «nations» at war. The resulting «war
of words» was fought by way of public statements as well as through debasing accusations
and insults which were voiced in the media and, increasingly, in the air. The respective
diaspora  joined  in  and  loudly  took  part  in  the  globalized  realm  of  internet8.  New
suppressed memories were made to surface and came to be articulated during this period
in  a  fierce  battle  of  definitions  and  slogans  concerning  the  «we»  and  «them»,  the
«nation» and its «enemy». New sites of memory came to be proposed, while old ones were
revisited and rewritten in the field. Thus war itself became a living «lieu de memoire», a
realm which visibly revealed old rivalries and long-felt chains of collective resentment.
War events were thus lived as occasions of memory, «history-repeating-itself» in such a
way as to confirm the new identity of the nation-in-the-making, offended and denied by
the other side's national destiny; commemorating war events became a way to come to
terms publicly and settle accounts with a troubled past,  to disentangle oneself,  so to
speak, from the once-shared collective memory of the country. The war at the border was
thus accompanied and sustained by a parallel war of memories inside both countries.
6 The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea offers an interesting case of acknowledgement
of tense past which may be of interest here to compare, and contrast, with parallel cases
in  the  region.  It  is  not  my aim here  to  discuss  the  conflict's  causes  or  describe  its
foreseeable consequences for both countries in the political geometry of the region. The
Ethio-Eritrean war remains as yet the most intriguing and the least analysed or explained
among  the  region's  conflicts  in  an  area  which  has  witnessed  recurrent  forms  and
transformations of collective violence9. Rather, I am interested here to outline how war
itself was used in Ethiopia to help the country's settling accounts with, and re-shaping of,
its own past. The historiographical change of course owes nothing to the war itself, whose
causes and results are yet to be settled, but to the way the conflict has been presented to
the Ethiopian public particularly by the State media (including the internet) and in the
private press.
7 As I had a chance of visiting the country repeatedly since the beginning of the conflict, I
will report here my experience of living through these war events and discussing them
with several Ethiopian and Eritrean colleagues as they were unfolding. Being Italian, I was
particularly  struck by the sudden «return of  memory» the conflict  unleashed in the
collective memory of the country concerning the earlier «act of aggression» by Fascist
Italy in 1935. All along the two-year conflict, war events were locally commented with a
constant «look backward» effect, with the Eritreans acting as the new external threat to
the country's integrity as colonial Italy had done in the past. Old and new sites of memory
thus  emerged  during  the  conflict,  and  the  memory  of  the  Battle  of  Adwa,  whose
centenary had just been celebrated three years earlier, was called back, this time as a
memory-against no longer geared to the Italian invader but to the newly-coined aggressor,
«fascist» Eritrea.
«During the era of colonialism, Eritrea has served as the citadel of Italian Fascism
[...].  And as if  the deeds of colonial times were not enough, it  is once again the
Eritrean elite which, in their effort to rekindle the Italian dream, [...] started the
current conflict. Just like the Italian master once did, it is the Eritreans who have
caused the displacement of over 300,000 people from their homes. It is the Eritreans
who have invaded the Ethiopian territory, and despite resolutions from the world
body to  withdraw from Ethiopian territory,  have given a  deaf  ear  to  the world
community»10.
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8 Although the historical analogy with colonial Italy reflected in many ways a search for
legitimacy by the Tigrayan leadership over a fractured country, there is no doubt that the
traumatic experiences of the Italian aggression, and the transfer of guilt to the Eritrean
enemy which was shaped in the course of the conflict, helped sustain the war effort and
was used to instil a national sense of belonging of which the Eritreans were no longer
part.
9 This became particularly clear after Ethiopia's counter-offensive of 23-26 February 1999
which disrupted the Eritrean line of defence around the town of Badme and repelled the
enemy across the border11. The crushing victory at the Badme front followed nine months
of  desultory  trench  warfare  and  extensive  military  build-up  during  which  the
government had been repeatedly called to task for inaction. The military victory over the
Eritrean enemy was to be celebrated accordingly. Thus, although the official news of the
successful counter-offensive against Eritrean troops at the Badme front was announced
on February 27, 
«the government did not encourage street celebrations on the subsequent days.
The TPLF government wanted to score a propaganda victory as well by delaying it
until the 103rd Anniversary of the famous Victory of the Battle of Adwa, thereby
equating the Badme success with the glorious victory of Adwa. Thus on the eve of
the 103rd anniversary, the Lualawinet and Security Committee of Addis Ababa City
Council called on the people to come out into Mesqel Square to celebrate the double
victory on March 2, 1999»12.
10 On that day,  the traditional commemoration of the Battle of Adwa saw a «mammoth
crowd» variously estimated between 500.000 and one million people gather for the Adwa
anniversary celebrations at Masqal Square13. The unusual mass attendance — possibly the
greatest gathering of city residents since the coming to power of the new government14 —
was reported by Richard Lee, BBC correspondent in Addis Ababa, in the following terms: 
«There  were  remarkable  scenes  this  morning  in  Addis  Ababa  [...].  The  Masqal
Square which used to be known as Revolution Square was overflown with up to a
million people. There were groups of people chanting and dancing, singing praise
songs for the soldiers at the front and also denouncing the Eritrean government.
Many people were carrying placards [...]. At one point, there was an effigy of the
Eritrean President which was paraded around the square. They tried to burn it but
they were stopped by the police. So, instead, they just threw it on the ground and
kicked and tore it to shreds»15.
11 Clearly,  the  tension  which  had  accumulated  in  Ethiopia  in  the  long  «nine  months  of
patience»16, and during the heated propaganda war which was daily exchanged between
the two countries all along the conflict17,  found in the anniversary of the 1896 major
victory over the Italian army a long-repressed relief. But there was more to it. Because of
the calculated matching of the dates of the two war events, the Battle of Badme soon
became to be equalled to its more famous predecessor, the Battle of Adwa. Thus Badme
was conveniently labelled «the second Adwa». During the following week practically all
electronic and print media equalled «Ethiopia's resounding defeat over a numerically
mammoth Eritrean army» to the «historic feat» accomplished at Adwa in 189618.  The
argument was best synthetized by Abyiotawi Demokrasi, a private Amharic weekly in these
terms: 
«Some 103 years ago a historic feat was accomplished: Ethiopian warriors, armed
with primitive weapons but full of courage, trounced a well-armed, well organized
aggressor army from Italy. Forty years later, Fascist Italy's army invaded Ethiopia
once  again.  Its  cowardly  army  used  internationally  prohibited  poison  gas.  Its
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victory was short-lived, and was finally kicked out, humiliated. Nine months ago,
Issaias Afeworki, a brainchild of his Italian colonial masters, invaded Ethiopia. True
to their history, Ethiopians once again punished and will continue to punish this
latest aggressor [...]»19.
12 The Ethiopian Register, an Amhara-based diaspora journal normally quite critical of the
Tigrean-led Ethiopian government at home, commented the event in no less glowing
terms: 
«Whether there is coincidence or not, March 2 is the 103 anniversary of the Italian
defeat at Adwa under the leadership of Atse Menelik. Whether intended or not, or
by coincidence or not, the symbolic metaphor is not lost that yet another arrogant
enemy was  humiliated  on the  same day as  the  Italian  colonialists  were  routed.
There was national unity then, as there was unprecedented national unity now,
against aggression»20.
13 The historical comparison between Adwa and Badme was not unexpected. The «war of
words» which had preceded the Ethiopian victory on the Badme front had seen a massive
propaganda  effort  on  both  sides  which  made  frequent  use  of  insulting  epithets  and
debasing  accusations.  On  the  Ethiopian  side  (the  only  one  I  can  witness  here),  war
propaganda closely associated Eritrean aggression to Italian colonial  ambitions in the
region and to the legacy of racist arrogance they had left behind.
14 Reacting to President Issayas' remarks made on 18 July 1998 that the «elite of Tigray have
this baggage of feeling inferior, marginalised and wanting to assert itself by expanding
territory»,  an  anonymous  internet  dispatcher  calling  himself  Dagmawi  responded by
indicting 
«the Fascist-era ideology: it humiliated Eritreans and relegated them to sub-human
status. In the search for positive self-identity, those Eritrean elites who had adopted
some superficial Italian cultural aspects began to look down upon their 'uncivilised'
fellowmen. The self-hatred caused by Italian colonialism was turned around and
reflected on the common people of Ethiopia and Eritrea who were still in tune with
their  culture.  It  is  this  attitude  which  has  been  perpetuated  through  the  past
several decades, sadly contaminating the Eritrean identity. It is this phenomenon
which has created the paradox whereby the indigenous cultural heritage of Axum is
disparaged and the current inhabitants of the town derided as 'Agames'. In its place
the Eritreans substitute the foreign trappings left behind by the departing Italians
and cherish these relics as if they created them themselves»21.
15 Although the state media were more restrained in their formal statements and official
declarations22, both electronic and printed media particularly in the private press made
recurrent use of Italian war images of the Fascist period manipulating faces and slogans
to point  to the new Eritrean «fascists» and to their  coarse parroting the ex-colonial
masters. Thus a National Geographic picture of 1935 showing young Eritrean boys swearing
«to become loyal balillas» was transformed in the web into «Issaias and Eritrean boys tak
[ing]  the  oath  and  swear[ing]  to  become  loyal  balillas»,  the  picture  itself  being  heavily
manipulated as the Eritrean president's  face was superimposed to that  of  the Italian
militia  officer23.  Terms  such  as  «banda»,  «fascist»,  «ascari»,  people  affected  by  «the
mulatto disease» or  by «the abused wife syndrome» were often used to indicate the
Eritrean  enemy  in  the  Ethiopian  media  and  the  private  press,  thus  indicating  the
continuity between the old Eritrean «collaborators» and their present heirs in the new
«colonial regime» at Asmara, their government named constantly «Shabia» from the old
EPLF times of war, while the term «woyane», after the Tigrean rebellion of 1943, was
constantly used by the Eritreans to denote the Ethiopian TPLF leadership.
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16 The crude labelling was not just a rhetorical device which graphically aired the growing
resentment among the Tigray leadership vis-a-vis the old allies now turned into enemies.
As  the  conflict  built  up,  the  deep  contrasts  between  the  two  fronts,  which  had
accompanied all along the uneasy anti-Mengistu alliance24, were openly debated breaking
a tradition of  secrecy which had been typical  of  the two fronts  but  which was now
allowed to surface in the public arena. In fact, the internal contrasts between the old
allies  in the field — TPLF and EPLF — was soon submerged by a  much broader and
widespread anti-Eritrean resentment which openly surfaced within the Ethiopian public,
promptly stimulated by a strong propaganda machinery which daily ignited and kept it
alive.  The resentment had many causes of  which the forced independence of  Eritrea
agreed by the two fronts in the absence of a public debate, and the expulsion of some
120,000  Ethiopians  from  independent  Eritrea  were  by  no  means  the  only  ones:  the
privileged position Eritrean citizens maintained in Ethiopia particularly after the 1993
referendum,  their  enjoying  a  de  facto dual  citizenship  which  allowed  them  to keep
positions of power and wealth in the two countries, and the protection accorded them by
the EPRDF government, were equally important factors. The ensuing deportation of some
60,000 Ethiopian citizens of Eritrean origin was the sad outcome, and the late replica, of
the  earlier  expulsions  from  independent  Eritrea  of  the  Ethiopian  military  and
administrative personnel together with their families25.
17 Yet  the  war  unleashed  another  tense  but  hidden  memory:  that  of  the  Eritrean
collaborators in the 1935 Italian occupation of the country. Until the recent conflict, on
the whole Eritreans had not been made accountable for their past participation in the
Italian colonial venture and occupation of the country. Following the liberation in 1941,
and particularly after the federation with Eritrea in 1952, the nationalistic mythology
which  developed  around  the  anti-Fascist  resistance  required  a  certain  «degree  of
historical  amnesia»  which  was  to  sooth  the  newly-found unity  between ex-resisters,
exiles and collaborators.
«In this nationalistic environment, tacit encouragement was given to amplify one's
contribution  and  tactfully  to  avoid  discussion  of  the  deficiencies  of  others.
Individuals  who  had  served  the  Italians  as  askaris  (regular  soldiers)  or  bande
(irregulars) largely became mute, unwilling and unencouraged to say much about
the  wartime  experiences.  Certainly  the  history  books  did  not  record  their
involvement (or did so minimally) and there was little serious effort to understand
why they made the choices that they did»26.
18 Thus, throughout the post-liberation period, it was the Eritrean patriots' resistance to
Italian rule which was celebrated and many Eritreans were called in to help in the post-
war reconstruction effort. Thus, the fact that Eritrean troops accompanied the Italian
colonial army in 1896, and were massively used during the short-lived Fascist occupation
of  the  country,  became  part  of  a  grieved  yet  silenced  past.  Ironically,  the  Eritrean
«colonial» factor was not allowed to surface in Ehiopian society till the Eritrean liberation
movement decided to employ it to define its strategy for independence, and even then it
was  openly  dismissed  by  Ethiopia  in  her  consistent  denial  of  Eritrea's  request  for
independence as an ex-colonial country wanting to decolonise. Yet, in a few months, the
war  with  Ethiopia  changed  all  this,  and  the  war  freely  unleashed  an  anti-Eritrean
«colonial» memory which till then had been repressed or removed.
19 Then the real meaning of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, and the historic importance of the
victory of Badme-Adwa, was to make the separation between two «brother» countries
possible  because  it  transformed,  albeit  traumatically,  a  political  event  (the  Eritrean
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independence) into a cultural one. In this sense the conflict has been a real turning point
for  both  countries  and  the  lengthy  war,  though  miscalculated  at  first,  helped
consolidating a separate identity for both: this is perhaps one of the main reasons why it
lasted so long.  The conflict  helped forging,  perhaps irrevocably,  an Eritrean national
alterity which was denied throughout thirty years of war but which confronts today the
Ethiopian society and its acknowledgement of a peculiarly tense past. If Ethiopia was to
be separated from Eritrea, it needed an irrevocable caesura. The war events helped to
provide it: 
«Bad me is a place of no particular consequence in the highlands between Ethiopia
and its  much smaller  kin,  Eritrea, two nations  of  great  promise  in  the Horn of
Africa. But lying on the battlefields near the town are the corpses of 10,000 soldiers
— maybe less, maybe more — who died over the last month because each nation
claims Badme and the surrounding area as its own»27.
20 It  is the corpses of those «10,000 soldiers,  maybe less,  maybe more» that are making the
irrevocable difference deep inside the Ethiopian nation and its ethos of wounded outrage
and irreparable moral offence: 
«The cluster bombs dropped [over] elementary schools killing children,  and the
bombs dropped on innocent civilians who were in line to receive food assistance in
Adigrat, and the exodus of the Eritreans from Ethiopia and Ethiopians from Eritrea
have assured us that we will be two separate and distinct countries»28.
21 As the TPLF-led coalition gradually consolidated its leadership over a country-in-arms,
the war achieved important political assets for the Ethiopian government. Although its
policies were critically exposed in the private press before the war, the political returns
of the victorious events were clearly perceived:
«The Ethiopian Government, which had low support in the country because of the
ever deteriorating economy, has now allied Ethiopians behind it and garnered a lot
of support. Though Ethiopians may have their domestic grievances, they are ready
to defend their country... No doubt that the Government of Ethiopia has taken full
advantage of this war, which is indeed a blessing to it. It has armed and fortified
itself and maybe for the first time has become untouchable both for domestic and
outside threat»29.
22 And again,  soon after  the  end of  hostilities,  observers  agreed that  «Ethiopia's  latest
offensive  against  Eritrea  has  undoubtedly  strengthened  the  position  of  the  ruling
coalition government. The war has produced a new sense of national unity and removed
much of the suspicion and distrust with which the EPRDF administration has been viewed
by many Ethiopians previously concerned about Tigrayan dominance in national politics»
30.
23 At the historiographical level, the present conflict is further inspiring a new Tigrean-
oriented historical writing which the recent victory over Eritrea appears to sanction and
legitimate  on  the  ground.  According  to  Medhane  Tadesse31,  Tigray  always  acted  in
Ethiopian history as the «senior partner» of the wider Tigrinya-speaking region. It was
the Tigray lords who had «precedence and grandeur» over their northern rivals since
Alvarez times and always «acted as protectors of their junior partners to the north of the
Mereb»32.  It was Italian colonial presence that first instilled «an incipient supremacist
feeling among the Tigrinya-speaking Eritrean urban elite vis-a-vis the Tigray and other
Ethiapian nationalities»,  while  colonial  Fascism inevitably  bred «the mutation in  the
character,  behaviour  as  well  as  socio-cultural  identity»  of  particularly  the  modem
urbanized Eritrean elite. Fiat cars and Italian villas thus gave the Eritreans a false sense of
Violence and the acknowledgement of tense past in the Horn: a note on the Eth...
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 2 | 2002
7
superiority which entrenched itself  and affected Eritrean nationalism at a time when
Tigray was impoverished and starved by a centralized feudal state33.
24 But the Tigray political elite, tells us Medhane, did not fall into the easy trap of Eritrean-
Tigrinya nationalism. From the beginning it opted for Ethiopia and maintained its pledge
throughout.  Thus the anti-Mengistu struggle which was fought together with the ex-
Eritrean  allies  is  explained  today  by  Tigrean  intellectuals  as  being  only  tactical,
beleaguered as it was by continuous superiority complexes and arrogant behaviour by
EPLF, and by deep strategic and political divergences34. Thus, while TPLF reorganized the
country under a coalition government and, although traumatically, «applied the principle
of self-determination and ethnic federalism», EPLF went on building, as it had been doing
from the start, «a nation from above». The two governments thus adopted «diametrically
opposite and even hostile political systems»35.
25 Seen in this perspective,  the victory over the Eritrean aggressor is  indeed a «second
Adwa»,  a  major  war  of  national  identity  and the  beginning  of  a  new cycle  of  state
formation and consolidation of supremacy in the region of the Horn36. It has helped the
country  to  redefine  an  enduring  site  of  memory  and  charge  it  with  new  symbolic
meanings  which  were  daily  sanctioned  by  the  conflict  itself.  It  is  through  war  that
Ethiopian  society  was  brought  to  internalise  the  political  wound  of  Eritrean
independence, while strengthening at the same time the feeling of unity in the country.
26 How much this war-created unity of a flimsy nature is shown by the recent crises which
assailed recently both the Ethiopian and the Eritrean governments, with serious splits
among  the  two  leading  political  fronts,  mass  arrest  of  opponents  following  student
protests and the early stepping down of the Ethiopian President Negaso Gidada from
office. While the internationally-supervised demarcation of the border is hampered by
political  and technical  difficulties  on the ground,  observers  recognise  today that  the
«nature of the violence perpetrated in this two-year war has sunk in deep into the public
consciousness» and has been dangerously «internalized»: «The deep antipathy, and often
hatred, now generated is a social fact which will have serious consequences. Of course not
the violence in battle but the often unspeakable abuses against civilians that created the
deep resentment, also among people with no interest in politics and no commitment to
yet  another  war:  the  expulsions  of  each  other's  citizen,  the  arbitrary  killings  and
disappearance of people, the robbing of labour migrants of all of their possessions and
savings, the internment of so-called 'enemy people' in camps under dismal conditions,
the physical abuse, and the torturing and humiliating of ordinary people»37.
27 If the rationale of the war was to «create difference and anchor it psychologically» in the
country at large, the war has been an easy win, and its net result will be «the impending
creation of  an iron-clad,  physical  border between Ethiopia and Eritrea,  in an area of
transborder  contacts  and  shared  identities,  [which]  will  yield  a  new  element  of
instability»38.
28 Such a border in fact has been and will remain of artificial colonial nature. It will divide
cross-border groups and local communities, such as the Irob, the Kunama and the Afar,
who have always lived, and have been purposely maintained, at the periphery of any
colonial or internal government: «people on the borders who have for centuries never
known the difference: worshipped together, celebrated together and intermarried. [...]
This  war  is  easier  for  someone  from Addis  Ababa  and  Asmara  than  those  living  in
Zalambessa, Irob, and Badme. People there on both sides of the border have more in
common with the 'enemy' than with their countrymen. This is a conflict that splits family
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members into two military camps. It has brought Cousin against Cousin. Trying to draw a
straight boundary line through the people above is in itself a crime. [...] Hatred that has
already been plowed will be harvested, and there will not be an end after the conclusion
of the war. [...] The most probable outcome of this war [is] that there will not be a winner
and a loser, only two losers»39.
29 The tremendous social and human costs of the Ethio-Eritrean war, the toll of human and
material distruction it has left in the entire border region, and the new unacknowledged
«legacy  of  violence»  it  will  leave  in  the  region  of  the  Horn,  may  soon  form a  new
intractable web of divisive memories which may be even more difficult to appease or
simply acknowledge in the future.
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NOTES
1. See Triulzi, 2002.
2. McClellan, 1996:60, fn. 38.
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4. See, among others, Bahru, 1991; Mohammed Hassen, 1990; Asafa Jalata, 1993; Sorenson,
1991, 1993; De Waal, 1994; Baxter et al., 1996; Clapham, 1999, 2000.
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6. Idem, p. 59.
7. Abbink, 1998.
8. For Ethiopia see the collection of  «Despatches» now printed in Walta Information
Center, n.d., and the forum and chat pages of Ethioforum, Warka, or Ethio.com. For Eritrea,
see the websites of Asmarino.com, Dehai.org, Eritreal.org, etc. For a detailed account of the
war in the internet and a description of the various web pages involved in the conflict,
see Guazzini, 2001.
9. For an analysis of the Ethio-Eritrean war, see Abbink 1998, Trivelli 1998, Gilkes & Plaut
1999, Medhane 1999, Tekeste & Tronvoll, 2000, Clapham, 2000.
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10. Tesfay Debrezion, Mussolini's Choir, posted 10 June 1999, in Walta Information Center
n.d.  [2000],  pp.  121-122.  Square brackets in the original  text.  The collection contains
several hundred messages posted on the Ethiopian Walta Web Site.
11. The victory of Badme, which left on the ground an estimated 20,000 casualties on both
sides, saw a gruesome 3-day Ethiopian assault on fortified Eritrean positions. The battle
was  fought  between 23-26  February  with  mop up operations  the  following  day.  The
military operation, which was titled Operation Sunset, derived its name from a quote by the
Eritrean President, lsayas Afeworki, that Eritreans would not withdraw from the occupied
territories «not even if the sun doesn't rise». See Press Digest (English, private weekly,
hence PD), 4 March 1999, pp. 1-3.
12. See the special report in Ethiopian Register, April 1999, pp. 9-11.
13. See report in PD, 11 March 1999, p. 9. Ethiopian Police gave the lower figure the day
after the event. See The Monitor (English, private weekly), 4 March 1999.
14. Contrary to the previous regime, the EPRDF government had been so far loth in supporting
mass rallies.
15. PD, 11 March 1999, p. 10.
16. «We  endured  foreign  occupation  and  humiliation  for  nine  months  in  the  hope  that  the
international community would convince Eritrea to accept a peaceful solution to the conflict», 
Office of the Government Spokesperson, Official Statement, 6 March 1999, Addis Zemen
(Amharic, Government daily), 7 March 1999, as quoted in PD., 11 March 1999, p. 11.
17. See Abbink, 1998:554.
18. See PD, 4 March and 11 March 1999.
19. Allyiotawi Demokrasi (Amharic, private weekly), 2-8 March 1999, as quoted in PD, 11 March
1999, p. 11.
20. Mamo Muchie, «From Adwa to Badme: Lessons from History», Ethiopian Register, April 1999, p.
32.
21. Dagmawi, posted 30 September 1998, in Walta Information Center, cit., p. 117.
22. Not so the Ethiopian daily radio broadcasts in Tigrinya addressed to the Eritrean public,
themselves an answer to the vitriolic propaganda daily broadcasted in Amharic from Asmara.
23. The National Geographic picture was shown repeatedly on the Internet in the «Ethiopia-
Eritrea  Conflict  Webpage»,  a  private  pro-Ethiopian  network.  See  http://www.geocities.com
(consulted  13.05.1999).  Another  much  abused  image  was  the  one  depicting  Hitler  talking  to
Mussolini  and stating,  in  the  superimposed caption pointing  to  a  smiling  lssaias,  «He is  MY
student and I have taught him well. One day he will be a real fascist under OUR command». The
picture was printed in the forum at http://www.ethio.com (cons. 13.05.1999).
24. On the contrasts between TPLF and EPLF see in particular Young, 1996, pp. 105-120.
25. The trauma of the reciprocal deportations and dehumanizing modalities which accompanied
them  will  remain  in  the  collective  memory  of  both  Ethiopians  and  Eritreans  yet  another
unacknowledged and unaccountable structure of violence in the region. On this point see Gilkes
& Plaut, 1999, pp. 11, 54-56.
26. McClellan, 1996: 66.
27. Ian Fisher, «Whenever that town is, someone will die for it» (reprinted from The New
York Times), in The Reporter (English, private weekly), 24 March 1999.
28. Sotal, «Eritrea and Ethiopian Bitter Divorce» (Part Il), in Addis Tribune, 12 March 1999.
29. Hashim Ahmed, «Eritrea's Problem is a Leadership Future», in Addis Tribune, 12 March
1999, cit. Not all private press aligned itself. On June 3 Tobyia (Amharic, private weekly)
wrote: «We had thought that we have avoided war once and for all and restored lasting
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peace in our country. Sad enough, we have once again sled into another morass of war —
a  war  of  destruction  and  misery...  [while]  another  round  of  drought  and  famine  is
hovering over the country». See PD, 10 June 199, p. 6.
30. P. Biles, «Bitter Foes», Diplomatic Briefings, Addis Ababa, Vol. XV, No. 72, 2000, p. 22.
31. See Medhane Tadesse, 1999. Though not an official publication, the volume has been
massively diffused in Addis Ababa and in the media.
32. See ibid., pp. 5-7.
33. Ibid., pp. 26-43.
34. Ibid., pp. 50-86. For a similar argument, see Adhana 1994.
35. Ibid., p. 102.
36. In this sense also Clapham, 2000.
37. Abbink, 2001: 449-50.
38. Ibid., pp. 448-49.
39. Sotal, cit., p. 9.
ABSTRACTS
In this paper, the author attempts to describe how, during the two years of bloody conflict which
confronted the newly-born State  of  Eritrea with its  old  «mother-country»,  Ethiopia,  the two
former allies and «brotherly» countries used war as an open way of acknowledging tense past
between them and in the country at large. Between May 1998 and December 2000, when the
peace accord was signed in Algiers, the two countries launched an extremely violent propaganda
war which accompanied and sustained the fighting in the field. This «war of words» was aimed
not only at defending the rights of each country over the disputed border areas, but at projecting
as well the newly-found national identity and consolidating its internal perception. A public use
of the past came to be enacted in an attempt to realign the historical identities of the countries
and to adapt them to the new geo-political settings which came about with the demise of the
previous Ethiopian regime in 1991.
Neste artigo, o autor tenta descrever a maneira coma, durante os dais anos de conflito sangrento
onde  o  recém-nascido  Estado  da  Eritreia  enfrentou  a  sua  antiga  «pátria»,  Etiópia,  os  dois
anteriores aliados e «países irmãos» utilizaram a guerra coma uma forma aberta de assumir as
tensões que no passado existiram entre eles e no país em geral. Entre Maio de 1998 e Dezembro
de 2000, quando um acordo de paz foi assinado em Alger, os dois países desencadearam uma
guerra de propaganda extremamente violenta que acompanhou os combates no terreno e os
sustentou. Esta «guerra de palavras» teve como objectivo não apenas a defesa dos direitos de
cada um dos países sobre as áreas fronteiriças disputadas, mas ao mesmo tempo a projecção da
percepção interna destas  identidades.  Uma utilização publica  do passado foi  encenada numa
tentativa  para  re-alinhar  as  identidades  históricas  dos  dois  países,  adaptando-as  ao  novo
contexto geo-político que se gerou depois da queda do anterior regime etíope, em 1991.
Dans cet article, l'auteur essaie de décrire la façon du conflit sanglant ou le nouveau-né Etat de
l'Erythrée a fait face à son ancienne «patrie», l'Ethiopie, les deux anciens allies e «pays frères»
ont utilisé la guerre comme une forme ouverte d'assumer les tensions qui dans le passé ont existé
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entre eux, et dans le pays en général. Entre mai 1998 et décembre 2000, quand un accord de paix
a été signé à Alger, les deux pays ont lancé une guerre de propagande extrêmement violente qui
a  accompagné  et  soutenu  les  combats  sur  le  terrain.  Cette  «guerre  de  paroles»  eut  comme
objectif non seulement la défense des droits de chacun des deux pays sur les régions frontalières
disputées, mais en même temps la projection des identités nationales, nouvellement rencontrées
peu  avant,  ainsi  que  la  consolidation  interne  de  la  perception  de  ces  mêmes  identités.  Une
utilisation  publique  du  passé  a  été  mis  en  scène  dans  une  tentative  d'en  arriver  à  un
réalignement des identités historiques des deux pays, en les adaptant au nouveau contexte geo-
politique survenu après la chute de l'antérieur régime éthiopien, en 1991.
INDEX
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